




 Klima

KLIMA CENTER'S

SB 60

**THOUGHT-LEADERSHIP
SERIES**

2024



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KLIMA VISITS BONN FOR SB60!

Klima representatives flew to Bonn, Germany in June of 2024 to observe, assess, and learn from the 60th Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies or SB60. Essentially, the June UN Climate Meetings are done in preparation for the Conference of the Parties (COP). In Bonn, parties hold negotiations to help set agenda items for COP.

For SB60 particularly, Klima followed discussions on the Global Stocktake, loss and damage, the Mitigation Work Programme, the Just Transition Work Programme, the New Collective Quantified Goal, and Action for Climate Empowerment and youth dialogues.

The articles in this e-zine are a product of Klima's participation in SB60.



CLIMATE FINANCE: A CALL TO ACTION FOR THE WORLD AND THE PHILIPPINES

TONY LA VIÑA AND JAYVY R. GAMBOA



In international climate negotiations, 2024 is the year of Climate Finance. Much attention at the upcoming 60th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB60) in Bonn, Germany this June and at the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan in November will be dedicated to the progress, if not the success, in negotiating the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG).

This is the backdrop upon which the Allied for Climate Transformation by 2025, or ACT2025, released its Call to Action titled “*Climate-Vulnerable Countries’ Expectations Leading to COP29*”.

ACT2025 is a consortium of think tanks and experts elevating the needs and priorities of vulnerable developing countries to deliver ambitious, balanced, just, and equitable outcomes at the UN climate negotiations and other multilateral fora to chart a path toward greater global solidarity.

Manila Observatory serves as a Core Partner of ACT2025.

The state of negotiations and climate action

While there has been significant progress in the past few years like the adoption and operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, the Call to Action points to unfinished tasks across the consortium's four pillars of Finance, Ambition, Adaptation, and Loss and Damage.

Finance lacking across the board: There is a growing gap between the needs of developing countries and the support provided and mobilized for their efforts to implement their national climate plans (UNFCCC 2023).

Widening gaps in mitigation ambition and implementation: The expected global average temperature increase by 2100 has dropped from 4 C to 2.5–2.9 C based on nationally determined contributions (NDCs)—significant progress, but still far from the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C threshold (UNFCCC 2022). Moreover, current policies are projected to result in higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than those implied by NDCs, and lackluster mitigation efforts in high-emitting countries will lead to greater needs for adaptation and addressing loss and damage in climate-vulnerable countries.

Adaptation keeps lagging behind: Gaps still exist in the implementation of, support for, and collective assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation. Current levels of support for adaptation remain inadequate to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing countries (UNEP 2023).

Loss and damage responses insufficient: Significant gaps related to addressing loss and damage persist, and there is a need to improve coherence and synergy among efforts pertaining to disaster risk management, humanitarian assistance, recovery and reconstruction, and displacement/migration, as well as address needs to increase speed of finance disbursement, among other issues (UNFCCC 2023).

However, the last-minute election of Azerbaijan to the COP Presidency makes the seasoned and the new actors in climate negotiations doubtful of the host's capacity to shepherd a crucial and highly contentious agenda, such as the NCQH. Azerbaijan's pillars for its Presidency, which is "to enhance ambition and enable action", seem vague and require a lot of nuancing to carry forward. To say the least, immense leadership, trust-building, and consolidation of gains are demanded from the Presidency.

Zooming into climate finance

The negotiations for the NCQG which started in 2022 and are expected to end in 2024 carry with it the burden of addressing the failures of the USD 100 billion goal agreed upon in 2010, and the much greater burden of finally delivering the finance needed by developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, among others.

In a working paper published by the World Resources Institute, *"Untangling the finance goal: An introduction to the new collective quantified goal"*, the key elements discussed in the negotiations refer to the quantitative amount and quality of finance, thematic scope, time frame of the goal, contributor base, and transparency arrangements.

The Call to Action summarizes the crucial aspects of the NCQG consistent with the needs of climate-vulnerable developing countries as follows.

1. Ensuring developed countries assume the responsibility and leadership of providing and mobilizing financial resources to support developing countries' transitions to 1.5°C-compatible trajectories and a climate- resilient future.
2. Aligning with the climate needs and priorities of the developing world, estimated in the trillions of dollars. The NCQG should align with the findings of the Global Stocktake, prompting a financial response equal in magnitude to the scale of action required for securing a low-emissions, climate-resilient future.
3. Encompassing the three pillars of climate action. Mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage response are central pillars of climate action, and should all be covered under the new goal.
4. Adopting a framework for the quality of climate finance. [T]he new goal must be shaped in a way that avoids exacerbating the already unsustainable levels of indebtedness of developing countries, prioritizing the use of non- debt instruments that prevent perpetuating climate finance as a synonym of climate-induced debt.
5. Facilitating accountability of the NCQG with a strong transparency framework. The mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the NCQG should use the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the issuance of biennial transparency reports (BTRs).

Not only for developed countries

While the Call to Action seems directed only at developed countries with the G7 at the forefront as well as the broader G20, it should also serve as an action plan for climate-vulnerable developing countries, such as the Philippines.

The Call to Action is a rich resource for negotiation positions that put forward the interests of the Global South. The Philippine delegation led by Climate Change Commission (CCC) Chair-Designate and Secretary of Environment Toni Yulo-Loyzaga, CCC Vice Chair and Executive Director Secretary Robert Borje, and Commissioners Rachel Anne Herrera and Albert Dela Cruz should consider adopting these positions in Bonn up to Baku. If climate-vulnerable developing countries will carry these common positions on NCQG, then we expect that the outcome in Baku will be robust.

Recently, the Philippine government has expressed its intention to host the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) Board to which the Philippines has gained a seat. While the discussions in the LDF will not be revisited in the NCQG negotiations, the latter has substantive implications on the LDF, particularly on the question of whether the new finance goals would also cover financing loss and damage. On a political level, a strong position of the Philippines in the NCQG negotiations complements its position and authority to host the LDF Board.

The NCQG negotiations presents an opportunity for the Philippines to show its leadership, especially that it is one of the many countries that urgently need the developed country-driven financing to meet their emissions target and, most importantly, to ensure that communities in the grassroots are protected from climate change impacts to the fullest extent possible.

It is not only about money; it is about responsibility. Fighting for a robust climate finance goal is a moral imperative for the Philippines.

For the discussion of the other ACT2025 Pillars, go [here](#).

This was originally published on [Rappler](#).

WHAT DOES “ON TRACK” LOOK LIKE? A GLIMPSE OF THE FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING THE FIRST GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

THEA UYGUANGCO



The whole point of the Global Stocktake is to look at our progress regarding our climate goals. The outcome of the Global Stocktake is our “report card” of how we’re doing collectively and to see if we’re “on track” to meeting the said goals. So, are we “on track”?

Just 12 days shy from Christmas 2023, the COP 28 Presidency released the first Global Stocktake outcome.

After much anticipation and anxiety, half a decade’s worth of taking inventory and tracking countries’ progress, boiled down to a 21-page text. Despite mixed reactions from parties and civil society alike, it is undeniable that the culmination of the first Global Stocktake is *historic*. We are finally faced with an assessment report of where we’re at in meeting the goals under the Paris Agreement. But the question is, was it only that? A piece of paper? Of course not. The success of the first Global Stocktake is heavily reliant on its implementation. And the following up on the GST 1 is *crucial* to its success.

As a brief background, during COP 20, 195 countries came together to ratify the Paris Agreement. Under which, those parties agreed to set a goal of keeping the global temperature rise to 1.5 Celsius. In that same agreement, it was agreed that parties are to take stock or take inventory of their progress in meeting nationally determined goals, collectively. This is the Global Stocktake or the GST, for short. The GST is a way of assessing the progress we are making, together. It also serves as a guide in informing countries on formulating their Nationally Determined Contributions which are due in 2025, the end of this critical decade.

Where we're at

As the GST 1 Outcome would show, we are not doing so well. Despite making strides in reducing our emissions, there is still a significant need to increase ambition in our Nationally Determined Contributions. And we need to do it quick.

This year, following the conclusion of the first GST, all eyes are on what we do next. During the 60th Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies' in Bonn, Germany, negotiations on the contents on the UAE Dialogue in relation to the GST and enhancements on the GST Process commenced. You might ask, *why are these important?* First, figuring out the modalities of the UAE Dialogue, determines what items will be discussed in such Dialogue which is critical in following up the first GST. Second, negotiations on enhancing the GST Process are essential in ensuring that we do not repeat mistakes in the past and that the GST Process will be smoother and better.



During the almost two-week conference, "Informal Consultations" to discuss these agenda items were had. Co-facilitators would then publish "Informal Notes" periodically which would be the basis for negotiation and discussion during each Informal Consultation. During negotiations, some parties were quick to say that the GST is non-binding and non-punitive and it is just a guide to inform Nationally Determined Contributions for parties. This is true, however, some parties also echoed that while the GST is not binding, the implementation of the GST outcomes must be taken seriously and that this is a collective responsibility among all parties involved.

By the end of the second week, many parties intervened that although they have many disagreements and discomforts in the final Informal Note published by the co-facilitators, they are happy with its current form and are ready to forward it to COP 29 for further negotiations. In UNFCCC Process standards, the negotiations during the SBs are considered a "success" by the mere fact that the parties were able to agree on an Informal Note. However, despite this "success" we are not moving fast enough. It is worth noting though, that progress is *still* progress. And we can jump off from that.

Looking forward

It seems like every year, we break records for temperature increase. Global temperature has warmed to at least 1.1C already as of last year. This is just .4 C shy from our cap under the Paris Agreement. This is cause for significant concern and we ought to call for a sense of urgency within our governments. This was highlighted during the Annual Global GST Dialogue during the SBs. The main point of discussion of the global dialogue was that of the Nationally Determined Contributions or “NDCs.”

Under the Paris Agreement, each country-party is required to prepare “Nationally Determined Contributions” which are mitigation efforts that each country must strive to achieve. These “NDCs” are submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat every five years—the next one being due in 2025, post-pandemic. These are due and required to be submitted every five years to increase ambition over time and each NDC will reflect the progression of the country’s ambition.

Over the course of the SBs, at almost every side event, every NDC-related mandated event, and sometimes during negotiations, it was reiterated that “we must scale up our ambition.” With record-breaking temperatures last year and following the outcome of the first GST, the next round of NDCs is encouraged to be very ambitious to meet our goals under the Paris Agreement. During the Annual Global GST Dialogue held, some countries, even those from developing countries shared their plans and ambitions for their NDCs. The Philippines, for one, said that their ambition is to reduce 75% of their emissions by 2030 and shifting more towards renewable energy use.

Other countries such as India, China, the United States of America also shared their countries’ plans on reduction of emissions. It is well worth noting that these countries’ ambition plans are the most important in the room, and the most anticipated. In World Resources Institute study in 2023, at least 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions come from the USA, China, and India alone.

Although the NDCs are domestic, not one county is fighting climate change alone. This is a shared and collective responsibility. We must remember however, that developed countries must take the lead in reducing their emissions. And it is imperative that the top emitters reduce their emissions drastically for us to save the world. When the USA, China, and India shared their plans during the global dialogue, it was ambitious. It did show that perhaps, there is hope yet. What are these plans if there is no action?

Final thoughts

For the GST, we already have working Informal Notes for further negotiations in Baku during COP 29 later this year. We might have to owe its “success” to the non-controversial subject matter, or perhaps the efficiency of the co-facilitators, or maybe the coordination and collaboration amongst parties. Regardless, we can only hope that once COP 29 rolls around, we’d see as much success on the negotiation front as we do on the ground and in the real world. As the decisions made in COP 29 might as well spell out our future.

It is dystopic to see our fate resting on the hands of a couple of people in a room. All these words, all these presentations, and all these speeches telling us that “we have to scale up ambition!” “We have to reduce our emissions!” “We do not have time!” It feels like the same words are repeated over and over and we’re doomed to an infinite loop of negotiations, discussions, speeches, and business as the bottom line. It is disappointing to admit and difficult to swallow, but this is the lesser evil moving forward.

Again, the question is, are we “on track”? If we keep things the way that it is, without proper implementation and follow up on the GST outcome, and without following through with our NDCs, we are *not* on track. But, if a sense of urgency and responsibility is instilled in our governments and with the guidance of the first GST, implementation of our goals should be possible. We are given all the tools to save the planet. The more important question is, *will we use them?*

Read the original article published by the Manila Observatory [here](#).

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LIFE IMITATES ART CLIMATE FICTION: SB60S, WHERE CLIMATE ACTION IS DISCUSSED, NOT FUNDED

BERNARDINE B. DE BELEN



At the top of my Did Not Finish pile, which pertains to books you put down before finishing, is *The Ministry for the Future* by Kim Stanley Robinson. It is a climate fiction novel putting us in the extremely futuristic world and timeline of 2025. In this book, the United Nations have finally decided to establish a new arm called the Ministry for the Future under the Paris Agreement that basically upholds the rights of 'Future People' in relation to climate change.

What I will not forget, despite not finishing it, is its opening scene. In 2025 in India, they have finally transitioned out of the common fossil fuels

we use. Despite the transition to renewable energy though, it's hot, so hot that people have resorted to sleeping in their roof decks naked, so hot that people barely went out.

In the midst of this heat, a sudden blackout. People started to evacuate to houses with generators that could handle air conditioning. People started to steal other peoples' generators and air conditioners. Some people had to resort to running to a lake which has turned just as hot. Bodies floated from the water. Corpses were covered in blankets in the makeshift evacuation centers. In this scene, the rescue took too long. People mainly just helped each other in any way they could, and those who survived tirelessly demanded ways to lower the Earth's temperature. The Ministry for the Future tries but fails, because how does one ministry fight an entire system, especially when they do not have enough resources either?

When I attended SB60, my first SBs, I could not help but think of this book—how serious the climate crisis is, how important that the people outside of Bonn are more empowered to commit to climate action, and how imperative the decisions are made in halls where the most affected cannot even attend.

This is the goal of ACE (Action for Climate Empowerment), to stimulate climate action on the ground in smaller and more particular communities. It was adopted by parties to refer to efforts in relation to Article 6 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, both emphasizing the need for climate change education, training, and public participation. In relation to this, ACE has six pillars, namely, 1) education, 2) training, 3) public awareness, 4) public access to information, 5) public participation, and 6) international cooperation. With the that education and the participation of people are vital to reimagine the current world and climate that we have, I followed the events of ACE throughout the June Climate Meetings.

There were two main ACE events that were expected to contribute to ACE's future moving forward, the ACE dialogue focusing on tools and support, and negotiations regarding the text of the ACE annual summary of 2023.

For the ACE dialogue at SB60 focusing on tools and support, it comes from ACE's four priority areas: 1) policy coherence, 2) coordinated action, 3) tools and support, and 4) monitoring, evaluation and reporting. During one of the two sessions they had, there was a panel of funders that explained how they evaluate and screen project proposals that are focused on ACE, giving advice on what makes a good proposal. In the other session, the attendees were divided into breakout groups where questions in relation to ACE's tools and support were asked.

One of the concerns brought up were the lack of resources, specifically extra manpower for ACE focal points. Other countries do not even have an ACE focal point at all. There was also a discussion on making the story of the climate crisis more human and relatable, taking into account the community's culture and context. One of the most glaring demands though was the need for funding. One group shared that financial resources are at the center of checking other things in the list.



Meanwhile, in the ACE negotiations done in SB60, parties discussed the text for ACE's annual summary report for 2023. At COP28, when they were supposed to agree on the text, they could not come with a consensus running into Rule 16. This basically says that if the agenda item was not completed within the given session, it has to be carried over to the next ordinary session—hence, from COP28 to SB60.

However, at SB60, the parties were only given two hours in total to discuss the text for the summary, one of the sessions even being cut short because there was a lack of draft text proposals. After the second session, the parties still could not agree. In particular, developed countries did not want to include language that would have allowed for more opportunities to discuss finance in ACE dialogues. This disagreement means that they will have to discuss the annual summary report for 2023 at COP29 in Baku, during the last quarter of 2024. There is also frustration in the fact that Baku has been labeled as a “finance COP” and ACE has hoped to secure some funds here. But without a summary for 2023, how are they supposed to begin discussing financial concerns?

In a press conference after the unproductive negotiations, both parties and non-party stakeholders expressed their disappointment. Fatou Ndeye Gaye, a party member of The Gambia, stated, “If those things are not implemented, then what do we tell our people on the ground who are waiting for us each time we travel and then come back with nothing?”

Kassim Hussein, a part of Ghana's party also said that he was taken aback when they could not settle with a text given that all parties were working amicably during SB56 which was how they came up with a four-year action plan for ACE. But at this point, with a midterm review looming in 2026, he asks, *how is ACE supposed to be implemented with little to no funding?*

Youth non-party stakeholders also expressed concern as the parties are not putting enough emphasis on empowerment for climate action. As Fatou Ndeye Gaye asked, *how are people supposed to push for climate action when they are not empowered and aware of the crisis?* They say that writing project proposals and enacting them are intrinsically linked to enabling finance.

At the end of the day, of COP, of SBs, the execution of a good plan will always come down to funding. In the Ministry for the Future, they are expected to change the world, to protect the future generations, through the same systems and with a limited budget. This is similar to what is happening to ACE. Frankly, in a world that runs on money, how do you empower communities to act without funding them? How can developed countries

express their remorse concretely for what developing countries are experiencing without providing financially?

In the Philippines we have suffered enough, and yet we will continue to suffer. I only hope that climate action on the ground can be taken more seriously and with ferocity, with community concerns brought to the international arena. After all, it is the smallest, most vulnerable communities that experience climate change impacts the most.

Read the original article published by the Manila Observatory [here](#).

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LESS TALK: MORE ACTION - THE LOSS AND DAMAGE IMPASSE

JOY REYES



Despite headways made during COP28 with regard to Loss and Damage, including the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund and the consensus to have the United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the UNOPS host the secretariat of the Santiago Network, progress has since slowed down. In SB60 in Bonn this year, the work has shifted back to conversations, which, while useful, are nowhere near sufficient to meet the urgent needs of developing countries and vulnerable communities experiencing the harshest impacts of the climate crisis.

In fact, while conversations were being had in the hallowed halls of the UNFCCC buildings, countries everywhere have been facing droughts, record-breaking temperature levels, floods, and losses to lives and livelihoods. Towards the end of the SBs, Sudan was reporting deadly heatwaves, and Kenya was in the midst of trying to recover from devastating floods. Hardly the “progress” touted by developed countries in the climate talks.

Updates from the first half of 2024

This is not to say, however, that there have been no movements in climate action; rather that the pace has been inadequate to meet urgent needs. Still, it matters to see and appreciate progress where it is found, celebrate successes, mourn losses, and stand in solidarity with each other in the goal to envision a

climate-just world.

The Glasgow Dialogue, for instance, concluded this year after a three-part series. While not the funding required by developing countries when it was first proposed, it was still a good opportunity for Parties and non-Party stakeholders to discuss what is needed when it comes to the loss and damage finance architecture. The discussion this year focused on coordination and coherence as well as gaps that are still not being highlighted in the loss and damage talks, including slow-onset events and non-economic losses and damage, which includes human mobility and displacement.

An agreement was also reached regarding the Terms of Reference for the 2024 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts.

With regard to the Fund itself, the World Bank had already confirmed it will be the interim host of the Loss and Damage Fund. It is to be noted, quite alarmingly, that as of writing, no new pledges have been made to the Fund: it still stands at around 700 million USD, a number so little as to be infinitesimal when taken within the context of the needs of developing countries. By way of analogy, Typhoon Yolanda (international name Haiyan), a category 5 typhoon that ravaged the country more than a decade ago, had for its damages around [2.2 billion USD](#). Clearly, therefore, the amount currently pledged was nowhere near sufficient to meet the needs of one category 5 typhoon more than a decade ago, and it will be nowhere near enough to meet the needs now. It will definitely not be adequate to meet the cumulative impacts of the climate crisis.

The Board of the Loss and Damage Fund will be having its second meeting from the 9th to the 12th of July in Incheon, Republic of Korea. The Board then will have to ensure that they continue to make meaningful progress on the efforts towards the full operationalization of the Fund in the speed needed to meet demands.

Finally, we come to climate finance. The negotiations on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) which needs to be agreed on in COP29 at Baku, Azerbaijan, has not just been slow, but incredibly divisive. The objective of the goal is to set a new amount that developed countries have to give developing countries in order to help the latter achieve their climate action plans, cognizant of the fact that the money currently pledged has been insufficient at best. The original pledge of 100 billion USD per year has not been met (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD said that the 100 billion was “materially achieved” in 2022, but much of these were in loans and not in forms that developing countries need), and now the needs are much greater.

Developing countries have emphasized that the discussion should focus on quantum (how much the amount should be) and timeline, but no agreement has been made just yet. Developing countries have also forwarded estimates that range from 1.1 to 1.3 trillion USD per year as the amount that they need, but developed countries have not committed to anything. The United States, however, have said that it will mobilize from a “floor” of 100 billion USD, which, again, is not enough. Significant work and progress needs to be done both in the lead-up to and during COP29 if countries are to ensure that climate finance is mobilized and utilized. There also needs to be an agreement on whether, crucially, loss and damage should be a sub-goal of the NCQG.

Cannot take a backseat

This year’s COP will be a climate finance COP, and while all eyes will be on the NCQG, loss and damage still needs to be made front and center of the discussions. The establishment of the Fund cannot be used to justify inaction and dwindling pledges as losses and damages will continue to be felt everywhere unless urgent and immediate action is made. Now the conversation needs to shift from the Fund itself to how the Fund can be utilized in a way that is rights-based, gender-responsive, and just. There has to be discussions on how the Fund will be replenished, as well as on how it will be accessed. Moreover, there needs to be genuine discussions on non-economic loss and damage, which has so far not been at the forefront of the climate discussions, despite the urgency to meet and respond to them. In all of these discourses, it matters so strongly that different, oft-unheard voices are centered and amplified, including, but not limited to, women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, laborers, and peasants, who are first to feel the brunt of the climate crisis and are most vulnerable to its effects.

Loss and damage will have to be a mainstay in the discussions, separate from, but in conjunction with, the other pillars of climate action. The work has to be scaled-up, and in a manner that is both complementary and synchronous: the work on adaptation, mitigation, climate finance, loss and damage, just transition, and climate empowerment need to all come together, and ensure that no one is left behind. This is the only way we can have a fighting chance to meet the 1.5 goal, and ensure that future generations will inherit a world that is not up in ashes.

Read the original article published by the Manila Observatory [here](#).

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A NEW CONVERGENCE IN JUST TRANSITION: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

JAYVY GAMBOA



The June 2024 UN Climate Change Meetings in Bonn, Germany witnessed the coming into action of the UAE Just Transition work programme, which was adopted at COP 28 (2023) in Dubai.¹ From co-facilitators, co-chairs now lead the Parties. From a mere possibility, the work programme is now a staple in the agenda. Twice-a-year Dialogues² on various topics related to just transition are also mandated now.

Despite this clear progress in negotiations and mainstreaming, it has yet to be seen whether the work programme remains a mere mechanism in the political grind, or it becomes a transformative space where meaningful action and outcomes begin.

State of negotiations in Just Transition work programme

During the Climate Change Meetings, the work programme had two agenda items: first, a review of the conduct of the Dialogues; and second, continuing negotiations on the implementation of the work programme.

Similar to other institutionalized Dialogues within the climate process, the recurring issue as articulated by the Parties is how their outcomes can contribute to the negotiations. The underlying intention is clear. For action-driven Parties, it is important that

¹ See UNFCCC, 3/CMA.5.

² For SB 60, the topic of the First dialogue under the UAE work programme on just transition pathways held on 2-3 June 2024 is “Just Transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement through NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDs”.

the Dialogues do not remain an avenue for presentations or country statements, but actually contribute to unearthing of issues on the work programme toward the ultimate goal of negotiations. For the Just Transition work programme, another key issue during the June meetings is the selection of topics and the increased participation of non-Party stakeholders from developing countries.

On the other hand, the negotiations on furthering the implementation of the work programme took a huge hit. The Parties were not able to agree to carry any draft decision for consideration in COP 29 in Baku. Contentious issues include the creation of a work plan for the work programme, which could set particular targets in negotiations, and balance of the work programme elements as mandated by the Dubai decision.

During the discussions, however, one of the substantive issues that Parties seem to converge into is that just transition as an agenda in international climate negotiations and the work programme itself should not be 'mitigation-centric'.

Not 'mitigation-centric'

This is not new, at least for the Parties. In the 2023 Dubai decision, the elements of the work programme include: "(c) Opportunities, challenges and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication as part of transitions globally to low emissions and *climate resilience*, taking into account nationally defined development priorities;"³ and "(d) Approaches to *enhancing adaptation and climate resilience* at the national and international level[.]"⁴

These seem a broadening of the usual suspect of just transition discourse. Just transition is usually viewed from the perspective of mitigation, or the transition to low-carbon economy as well as systems transformation, which requires the sun-setting of carbon-intensive systems and the creation of systems reliant on more sustainable sources of energy, to meet the Paris Agreement's temperature goal.⁵

Considerations of just transition in mitigation include the equitable distribution of costs and benefits among stakeholders while ensuring that workers in the affected systems, frontline communities that rely on such systems, and vulnerable sectors are not left behind. Social protection, social dialogue, and

3 UNFCCC, 3/CMA.5, para. 2 (c)

4 UNFCCC, 3/CMA.5, para. 2 (d)

5 See David J Hess, Rachel G McKane and Kaelee Belletto, 'Advocating a Just Transition in Appalachia: Civil Society and Industrial Change in a Carbon-Intensive Region' (2021) 75 Energy Research & Social Science 102004; Raphael J Heffron and Darren McCauley, 'What Is the "Just Transition"?' (2018) 88 Geoforum 74.

mechanisms to achieve these are also integral.

Now that just transition in adaptation is increasingly taking the space in negotiations and molding the narrative, it begs the question of whether it deserves a new framework of understanding and new demands for what *justice* looks like, and what may be the implications of this development both in the international and national adaptation efforts.

Prospects and implications of just transition in adaptation

The concept of maladaptive actions or maladaptation, or the “potentially adverse effects of certain forms of adaptation action, such as increased GHG emissions or increased vulnerability to climate change and diminished welfare of certain parts of a population now or in the future[.]”⁶ may be used as a starting point. For instance, just transition in adaptation efforts may have the prevention of maladaptation as an overarching goal. Thus, to some extent how adaptation is thought of and practiced today, by recognizing its potential unintended consequences and by ensuring that these are prevented in the process, already has just transition considerations.

Certainly, these can be applied in adaptation efforts that are still in the pipeline and are still yet to be implemented. How about those that have already been instituted or built, in terms of infrastructure, that actually lead to maladaptation? How can these be transitioned?

Drawing from the lessons of just transition in mitigation, the sun-setting of maladaptive actions and the creation of new ones in lieu of these is a scenario worthy of consideration. Some guiding questions may arise: *How can workers, frontline communities, and vulnerable sectors who rely on such maladaptive actions be transitioned? Is a rethinking of currently existing just transition strategies (e.g. forms of social protection) in the mitigation literature needed? What should justice look like in such transition?*

These are some questions to which answers need more investigation. On a conceptual level, whether there is a need for a new normative framework for just transition in adaptation, which builds upon the existing understandings of maladaptation, and what justice aspects or considerations it includes is certainly ripe for future research on just transition.

On an operational level, notwithstanding the novelty of these questions, the international community can definitely consider these in furthering negotiations on just transition and in

⁶ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) 165.

complementarity with the negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation. Meanwhile, the Parties can gradually integrate these in implementing their nationally determined adaptation plans.⁷

7 The Philippines recently launched its National Adaptation Plan 2023-2050. It may be accessed at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NAP_Philippines_2024.pdf.

Read the original article published by the Manila Observatory [here](#).

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